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THE PROTECTION OF MORAL RIGHTS
THROUGH SECTION 43(a) OF THE LANHAM ACT:
KING V. INNOVATION BOOKS AND
THE "BASED UPON" CREDIT
Sheldon Kendall Hardy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, best selling author Stephen King brought a claim against Allied
Vision and New Line Cinema to enjoin their distribution of the film "The Lawn-
mower Man" with a film credit representing that the film was "based upon"
King's short story of the same title King also sought to enjoin the use of a
possessory credit which represented that the film was "Stephen King's
Lawnmower Man." King brought his claim under §43(a) of the Lanham Act. The
court granted King's injunction against the possessory credit' but denied King's
request for an injunction against the use of the "based upon" credit concluding
that it was not false, misleading or likely to confuse as required under §43(a).3
Although not discussed in the opinion, one of the most significant aspects of the
case is King's attempt to vindicate through §43(a) his moral rights as an author
to prevent others from attributing to him a work which he did not create.
Moral rights protect the author's honor and reputation as embodied by their
* Ms. Sheldon Kendall Hardy received a J.D. from DePaul University College of Law in May
1993. She holds a B.A. in English from Dartmouth University.
1. King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992). In May of 1993, the parties entered
into a consent decree in which the defendants agreed to not use Stephen King's name, directly or
indirectly, in connection with the film "The Lawnmower Man," King v. Allied Vision, No. 92 Civ.
3852 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)(final consent decree).
2. The Second Circuit had no problem with the District Court's finding that King was likely to
succeed on the merits of his objection to the possessory credit. The District Court was entitled "to
conclude that a possessory credit is ordinarily given to the producer, director or writer of the film-
and that the credit at a minimum refers to an individual who has some involvement in, and/or gave
approval to, the screen play or movie itself. In contrast to other films for which he has been given a
possessory credit, King had no involvement in, and gave no approval of, "The Lawnmower Man"
screen play or movie." 976 F.2d at 829.
3. Id. at 830. The case which will be discussed in detail later involved the following: Stephen
King sued under §43(a)to prohibit the use of his name "on or in connection with" the movie "The
Lawnmower Man" which drew in some material respects from a ten page story written by him. King
contended that use of his name in (i) a possessory credit, describing the movie as "Stephen King's
Lawnmower Man," and (ii) a "based upon" credit, representing that the movie was "based upon" a
short story by King, falsely designated him as the originator of the movie. The court granted the in-
junction against the possessory credit. However, relying on copyright law in part to determine wheth-
er the movie was in fact "based upon" the story, the second circuit held that the movie draws in
sufficiently material respects on the short story in qualitative and quantitative aspects and thus the use
of the based upon credit was justified.
1
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work. "Moral rights do not depend on propriety of ownership of a work; rather
they represent the creativity behind the work and hence have been termed 'rights
of personality'."" Unlike copyright law which is designed to protect the econom-
ic interest of the copyright owner' and unlike §43(a) which is concerned with
consumer confusion,6 moral rights are directed at the protection of the creator's
4. Deborah Ross, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New Obligations for Author's
Moral Rights, 68 N.C. L. REV. 363, 367 (1990).
5. The Copyright Act protects the owner of the copyright in a work not the creator of the work.
One commentator has written: "By assuring the copyright owner the exclusive rights to reproduce
and distribute the original work, to prepare derivative works, and to perform and display publicly
certain types of copyrighted works, the 1976 [Copyright] Act focuses on the inherent economic value
of a copyright. Consequently, the primary objective of our copyright law is to ensure the copyright
owner's receipt of all financial rewards to which he is entitled, under the 1976 Act, by virtue of
ownership." Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1, 2 (1985).
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants certain exclusive rights to the owner of the copyright
in a work. It provides:
... the owner of copyright.., has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work...;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work...
(4)... to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5)... to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. §106 (1976).
Section 201 of the Copyright Act governs ownership of the copyright and transfer of such
ownership:
(a) Initial Ownership. - Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the
author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in
the work.
(b) Works Made for Hire.- In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other per-
son for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title,
and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all the rights comprised in the copyright.
(c) Contributions to Collective Works.- Copyright in each separate contribution to a col-
lective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initial-
ly in the author of the contribution. In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright
or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to
have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of
that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collec-
tive work in the same series.
(d) Transfer of Ownership.-
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any
means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will
or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in copyright, including any subdivi-
sion of any of the rights specified by § 106, may be transferred as provided by
clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is
entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies ac-
corded to the copyright owner by this title.
17 U.S.C. §201 (1976).
6. See generally, Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should be the
2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol4/iss1/2
PROTECTION OF MORAL RIGHTS
perpetual personal interest in his creation, regardless of who owns the propriety
interest in the work.7
The doctrine of moral rights generally embodies four components.' The first
is the right of paternity which may be divided into three categories.9 The first of
these categories is the right to attribution or anonymity, i.e. the right to compel
recognition of one's work.'0 The second category is the right to prevent others
from falsely claiming authorship of a work." The third category is the right to
prevent others from attributing to an author a work she did not create and does
not endorse. 2 This third category encompasses one of the rights asserted by
Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REv. 671 (1984).
7. Larry E. Verbit, Moral Rights and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Oasis or Illusion?, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 579, 581 (1988). In his seminal article on moral rights, Martin A. Roeder articu-
lated this difference between the protection accorded by copyright law and the protection accorded by
the doctrine of moral right:
When an artist creates, be he an author, a painter, a sculptor, an architect or a musician,
he does more than bring into the world a unique object having only exploitive possibil-
ities; he projects into the world part of his personality and subjects it to the ravages of
public use. There are possibilities of injury to the creator other 'than merely economic
ones; these the copyright statute does not protect. Nor is the interest of society in the
integrity of its cultural heritage protected by the copyright statute. Copyright law will
prevent A from reprinting the work of B without permission and will thus give B a limit-
ed monopoly on that work which may be exploited for the economic advantage of B; but
copyright law will probably not prevent C, the authorized publisher of B's works, from
publishing them in a manner harmful to B's honor and reputation as a creator.
Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators,
53 HARv. L. REv. 554, 557 (1940).
8. 2 Paul Goldstein, CopYRirHT at §15.23 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
9. Ross, supra note 4, at 368 (citing 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER on COPYRIGHT, §15.23.)
10. Traditionally, American case law has not given authors the right of attribution unless provided
for specifically in a contract. Ross. supra note 4, at 372. See, Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503
F.Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980); Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947)(because the author did
not expressly contract for attribution of his photographs, the magazine could claim authorship). Fur-
thermore, the Copyright Act's work for hire provision, which makes an employer the author as well
as the copyright owner of a work created by an employee within the scope of his employment, rein-
forces the role that, absent an express contractual undertaking, a publisher has no obligation to attrib-
ute authorship to a work's true author. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at §15.24.2. See supra note 5 for
text of work for hire provision 17 U.S.C. §201.
11. Even an author who has no right of attribution may have a right against misattribution to
someone else. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 15.24.2.2. In Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.
1981), the court refused to dismiss an actor's §43(a) Lanham Act claim based on the improper re-
moval of his name and the substitution of another's name in the film credits and advertising. Pro-
fessor Kwall suggests that Montoro can be regarded as a rejection of the traditional rule that a creator
is not entitled to credit for his work absent a contrary contractual provision. Kwall, supra note 5, at
19, n. 72. Professor Goldstein agrees that §43(a) of the Lanham Act, prohibiting misrepresentations in
the sale of goods or services, offers the greatest potential for relief against a publisher's failure to at-
tribute authorship. He notes that courts have held that distributing a work without attributing author-
ship violates §43(a) because it implies that the publisher rather than the actual author created the
work. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at §15.24.2.1(b).
12. This situation usually occurs when the "use of the authol's name involves the creation of a
derivative work by another who gives credit or attributes his ideas to the original author." Ross,
supra note 4, at 376. In Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), Dr. Seuss
1993]
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Stephen King in his effort to prevent the use of his name in connection with the
film "Lawnmower Man."
The second component of the moral rights doctrine is the right of integrity
which comprises the heart of the doctrine. This right prevents others from
distorting, mutilating, or modifying a work in a manner that would injure the
author's honor and reputation. 3 As will be discussed later, in some situations
the right of paternity is closely related to the right of integrity. 4 This close
relationship between the two rights is present in the King case where Stephen
King sought to enjoin the use of his name on a movie which altered his short
story by adding a substantial amount of additional material to it.
The last two components of the moral rights doctrine are not implicated by
this article's discussion of the protection of moral rights through §43(a) of the
Lanham Act. However, they are worth noting in a general discussion of moral
rights. They include the right of disclosure which allows a creator to determine
when and if to disclose or publish her work to the public"5 and the right of
withdrawal which allows an author to withdraw, modify, or disavow a work after
it has been published. 6
Not all countries that recognize moral rights support all four of these rights,
and the nature of the rights adopted differ from country to country.'7 Apart
from the closely circumscribed rights of paternity and integrity that § 106A of the
Copyright Act gives to qualifying works of visual arts, moral rights have never
formally been recognized by the law in the United States. 8
sued Poynter Products for copying the design of some of his characters to create dolls. Dr. Seuss
objected to Poynter's disclosure that the inspiration of the dolls came from Dr. Seuss drawings. The
court refused to grant relief under 43(a) regarding Poynter's disclosure. Id. at 353.
13. Ross, supra note 4, at 369 (citing the Berne Convention, art. 6bis(l)).
14. GOLDSTEIN. supra note 8, at §15.24.2.3. Professor Goldstein has observed, "An author's inter-
est in not being linked to someone else's work is closely connected to not having her work distorted.
In both situations, the author wants to have disseminated as her own only those works that she her-
self created." Id.
15. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8. at §15.23; Roeder, supra note 7, at 559.
16. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8. at §15.23; Roeder, supra note 7, at 561. Some commentators have
expressed doubts regarding the viability of the moral right of withdrawal because of the practical
inconsistency in assuming that the public will forget works to which it has already been exposed.
Kwall, supra note 5, at 6.
17. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at §15.23.
18. Id. Section 106A of the Copyright Act protects the right of attribution (paternity) and integrity
of qualifying works of visual art. The protection afforded by §106A is quite limited by the statute's
narrow definition of "work of visual art":
A "work of visual art" is:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limit-
ed edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered
by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabri-
cated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author
and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing
in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 cop-
ies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
[Vol. IV: I
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In 1988, prior to the enactment of §106A, the United States joined the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 9 This decision
17 U.S.C. §101 (1990).
In addition to defining "work of visual art," the statute also lists several items which are not "works
of visual art." These include:
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, mo-
tion picture, or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base,
electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering,
or packaging material or container,
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire;
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
17 U.S.C. §101 (1990).
Section 106A provides for the rights of attribution and integrity in works of visual art:
(a) Rights of Attribution and Integrity.- Subject to §107 and independent of the exclusive
rights protected in 106, the author of a work of visual art-
(1) shall have the right-
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual art which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of
the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modi-
fication of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputa-
tion; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in §113(d), shall have the right-
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modifica-
tion of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of
that work is a violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any
intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of
that right.
(b) Scope and Exercise of Rights.- Only the author of a work of visual art has the rights
conferred by subsection (a) in that work, whether or not the author is the copyright own-
er. The authors of a joint work of visual art are co-owners of the rights conferred by sub-
section (a) in that work...
(e) Transfer and Waiver.-
(1) the rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be transferred, but
those rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such
waiver in a written instrument signed by the author...
(2) Ownership of the rights conferred by subsection (a) with respect to a
work of visual art is distinct from ownership of any copy of that work,
or of a copyright or any exclusive right under a copyright in that work.
17 U.S.C. §106A (1990)(emphasis added).
19. Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988)(codified
in 17 U.S.C. §101, 104, 116, 116A, 205, 301, 401-408, 411, 501, 504, 801 (West Supp. 1989)). "The
Beme Convention is the oldest and most comprehensive international copyright treaty in the world.
The 77 members of the Berne Union include developing countries, communist countries, and free
market nations. Berne protects literary and artistic property and is dedicated to the concept of univer-
sal copyright protection. Beme's universal protection assures the citizens of its member states the
same degree of protection abroad that each state affords its own citizens." Ross, supra note 4, at 363, 5
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was surrounded by controversy due in part to the perceived incompatibility
between American copyright law and "Article 6bis" of the Berne Convention
which guarantees the author of a work certain moral rights separate from owner-
ship of the work and the economic rights of the copyright.' Specifically, it
requires member states to recognize the rights of paternity or attribution and
integrity.
Although the United States joined Berne in 1988, it did so without making
any changes to its domestic law regarding moral rights concluding that existing
state and federal law satisfied the convention's requirements.21 One of the feder-
n. 2. (citing S. Rep. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 and H.R. Rep. No. 609, 100th Cong.; 2nd
Sess.)
20. Ross, supra note 4, at 363-364. Article 6bis provides:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
21. Ross, supra note 4, at 364. The House Report on the 1988 amendments that conformed the
1976 Copyright Act to the Berne Convention's Requirements illustrates the view that existing state
and federal law in the United States satisfied Article 6bis. The Report stated in part:
The majority of witnesses testified that current laws in the United States, including
Federal and State statutory and common law, are sufficient, and that no legislation is
needed to comply with the requirements of Article 6bis. The Administration's opinion, ex-
pressed through the legislation introduced by Representative Moorhead and through the
testimony of various Administration witnesses, was consistent with this majority view.
According to this view, there is a composite of laws in this country that provides the
kind of protection envisioned by Article 6bis. Federal laws include 17 U.S.C. §106, relat-
ing to derivative works; 17 U.S.C. §115(a)(2), relating to distortions of musical works
used under the compulsory license respecting sound recordings; 17 U.S.C. §203, relating
to termination of transfers and licenses and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, relating to
the false designation of origin and false descriptions. State and local laws include those
relating to publicity, contractual violations, fraud and misrepresentation, unfair competi-
tion, defamation, and invasions of privacy. In addition, eight states have recently enacted
specific statutes protecting the right of integrity and paternity in certain works of art. Fi-
nally, some courts have recognized the equivalent of such rights.
H.R. Rep. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-34 (1988)(emphasis supplied).
The view expressed in the House Report that our laws contain sufficient moral rights protection
has been criticized by many commentators. See generally, Ross, supra note 4; Kwall, supra note 5.
Roeder wrote as early as 1940:
The application of so many different doctrines to a subject matter which is intrinsicly
homogeneous produces confusion; choice of theory becomes dependent on a fortuitous
combination of factors, rather than on the basic needs of the problem. Theories of libel,
with their concomitant necessity of setting forth the specific words, of proving pecuniary
damage, of showing malice in cases of excessive criticism, together with the probable
denial of injunctive relief, are not satisfactory; the concept of unfair competition, though
forever expanding, loses its basic meaning when applied to the protection of personal,
non-pecuniary rights. Copyright... was designed to protect only the exploitive value of
creation; its protection is not granted to the creator as such, but to the owner, the person
having the power to exploit the creation. The right of privacy is extremely limited and, in
some jurisdictions, exists only by virtue of a statute strictly construed and never designed
to protect the moral right.
[Vol. IV:I1
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al laws cited by the report as providing the kind of protection envisioned by
Article 6bis is §43(a) of the Lanham Act which prohibits false designation of
origin and false descriptions.'
With the understanding that the United States does not formally recognize
moral rights, except for those protected by §106A of the Copyright Act,23 and
that Congress intended for existing law to protect the rights of paternity and
integrity, this article explores how §43(a) of the Lanham Act has been employed
by authors and creators in false attribution cases to protect their moral rights of
paternity and integrity. After reviewing the development of §43(a) in this area
through a discussion of case law, this article specifically will focus on the novel
application of §43(a) in the King case, where author Stephen King sought to
prevent the use of his name in a commonly used "based upon" attribution.24
The article will examine the analysis used by the Second Circuit in King to
determine whether the "based upon" attribution was a false or misleading
representation under §43(a) with reference to existing standards which exist in
copyright and contract contexts for determining whether a work is "based upon."
Finally, the article will briefly explore the protection of paternity and integrity
rights through §43(a) after King.
II. SECTION 43(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT AS A SAFEGUARD OF MORAL RIGHTS
The Lanham Act is our Federal trademark statute.' The statute itself inc-
ludes a specific statement of purpose which provides, in part, that "[tihe intent of
this chapter is to ... mak[e] actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
marks... ; to protect persons engaged... in commerce against unfair
competition; [and] to prevent fraud and deception... by the use of reproduc-
tions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks."' 6 The
bulk of the Lanham Act is directed toward the prohibition of the unauthorized
use of marks or symbols which become associated with a producer's goods or
services where such use is likely to confuse consumers. It accomplishes this
by creating a cause of action on behalf of the owner of a federally registered
trademark against "[a]ny person who shall, without the consent of the regis-
trant..., reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark...
Roeder, supra note 7, at 576 (emphasis added).
22. H.R.Rep. No. 609, supra note 21.
23. See §106A, supra note 18.
24. King, 976 F.2d at 824.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (1988).
26. 15 U.S.C. §1127 (1982). The Senate Report on the Lanham Act contains a similar statement:
The purpose is twofold. One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in pur-
chasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the
product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has
spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in
his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274,
cited in Bauer, supra note 6, at 704.
27. Bauer, supra note 6, at 704.
1993]
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[where] such use is likely to cause confusion, or cause mistake, or to
deceive. '
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act offers a similar cause of action for those
whose marks have not been federally registered. In addition, it offers a cause of
action against persons making false representations or engaging in various forms
of unfair competition even where trademarked goods or services are not
involved.29 This second type of cause of action under §43(a) is the focus of this
article. The language of §43(a) which provides for such a cause of action
provides, in part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services... uses in
commerce... any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the.., origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or. her goods... shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.'
28. 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1988).
29. Bauer, supra note 6, at 704.
30. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides in full:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false desig-
nation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which -
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or deceive as to the affiliation, con-
nection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsor-
ship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, quali-
ties, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial
activities, shall be liable in a civil action by ant person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1988).
Section 43(a) was revised in 1988 under the "Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988." Prior to the
revision §43(a) provided:
Any person who shall affix, apply or annex, or uses in connection with any goods or ser-
vices, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation, including words or other symbols tending to falsely describe
or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and
any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or de-
scription or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in com-
merce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil
action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in
the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. §I 125(a) (1982).
The legislative history indicates that the changes made to §43(a) were meant to codify what the
courts had interpreted §43(a) to mean. Most significantly, the changes extended §43(a) to provide that
false advertising statements a person makes about another person's goods or services are as action-
able as false statements a person makes his own products or services.
134 Cong. Rec. H10411 (dail' ed. October 19, 1988).
[Vol. IV:I1
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This language has received expansive reading by the courts in the past two
decades." It has been employed by authors and creators where a reference used
in connection with an artistic or literary work is false, misleading or likely to
confuse."a Based on the expansive reach of §43(a), Congress,33 one court
and several commentators35 have explicitly recognized it as a vehicle to protect
the right of paternity and integrity of authors and creators in certain situations.36
As background to a discussion of the King case, this section of the article
examines various fact patterns in which §43(a) has been applied where an
author's name is used in connection with a work. For purposes of discussion,
these situations are divided into those involving the right of paternity and those
involving the right of integrity. Within these divisions, four basic fact patterns
are examined through a discussion of §43(a) case law.
A. The Right of Paternity
As mentioned earlier, the right of paternity protects three interests.3" The first
is the author's interest in being identified as her work's creator. Second, the
31. See generally Bauer, supra note 6.
32. King, 976 F.2d at 828; Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24-
25 (2d Cir. 1976).
33. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
34. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (court recognized cause of action under §43(a) for mutilation of
plaintiff's work where it stated,"this cause of action, which seeks redress for deformation of an
artist's work, finds its roots in the continental concept of droit moral, moral right, which may gener-
ally be summarized as including the right of the artist to have his work attributed to him in the form
in which he created it.")
35. See e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8; Verbit, supra note 7 (addressing how one may protect
against unconsented alteration or false attribution of one's work through the application of §43(a) and
concluding that the right of paternity receives stronger protection than the right of integrity); Com-
ment, The Monty Python Litigation - Of Moral Rights and the Lanham Act, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 611
(discussing of how the decision in Gilliam vindicated Monty Python's integrity right); Flore
Krigsman, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as a Defender of Artists' "Moral Rights". 73 TRADE-
MARK REP. 251 (1983)(finding that of all the legal theories which have been advanced to protect
moral right in the U.S., 43(a) offers the broadest protection). But see, Susan L. Soloman, Monty Py-
thon and the Lanham Act: In Search of the Moral Right, 30 RuTGERs L. REv. 452 (1977)(concluding
that 43(a) is of limited utility in protecting moral rights); Ross, supra note 4 (focusing on American
law's inability to protect moral rights).
36. In her article. The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New Obligations for Author's
Moral Rights?. Deborah Ross is skeptical that unfair competition law can protect moral rights due to
its economic orientation:
Although American unfair competition law affords some remedy in the case of substituted
attribution, it only protects authors from economic injury. The theory of unfair competition
is that a person should not reap economic benefits from falsely "passing off" her work as
that of another. Such damages would be difficult to prove for an unknown author or for
one involved in a collaborative venture. In addition, the emphasis on misappropriation of
profits seems antithetical to the concept of moral rights. An author protected by moral
right should be able to enjoin the misrepresentation of a work regardless of whether she
suffered any lost profits.
68 N.C. L. REv. at 375.
37. See supra notes 9-12. 9
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author's interest in not having his work attributed to someone else. Third, the
author's interest in not having her name used in connection with a work she did
not create.38 In the United States, the author who fails to secure these interests
by contract may obtain some protection for the latter two interests under
§43(a).39 Since the first interest has never been expressly protected other than
contractually," it will not be included in the following discussion of §43(a).
1. Omission of an Author's Name and Substitution of Another
Perhaps the easiest scenario in which to apply §43(a) successfully is one in
which a creator's right of paternity is violated by the omission of his name from
his work and the substitution of another.4' In this situation, the attribution to a
person who did not create the work is false on its face and easily falls into the
statute's "false or misleading representation of fact" language.
This scenario was illustrated in Smith v. Montoro42 where the Ninth Circuit
refused to dismiss an actor's §43(a) claim based on the improper removal of his
name by the film distributor and the substitution of another name in the film
credits and advertisements. The court found that the film distributor's conduct
amounted to actionable "express reverse passing off' which involves removing
the name or trademark on another party's product and selling that product under
a name chosen by the wrongdoer.43 The court stated that in a reverse passing
off case, the originator of the misidentified product is involuntarily deprived of
the advertising value of its name and of the goodwill that otherwise would stem
from public knowledge of the true source of the satisfactory product."M Further-
more, the ultimate purchaser (or viewer) is also deprived of knowing the true
source of the product and may even be deceived into believing that it comes
from a different source.4" The court found that this conduct was wrongful
38. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at § 15.24.2.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 11 for discussion regarding uncertainty as to an author's cause of action for
simple omission of his name from work where the right of attribution has not been provide for in
contract.
41. See supra note 11.
42. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
43. Id. at 607. The court explained that regular "passing off is the selling of a good or service of
one's own creation under the name or mark of another. Passing off may be either 'express' or
'implied'. Express passing off occurs when an enterprise labels goods or services with a mark identi-
cal to that of another enterprise, or otherwise expressly misrepresents that the goods originated with
another enterprise. Implied passing off occurs when an enterprise uses a competitor's advertising
material, or a sample or photograph of the competitor's product, to impliedly represent that the prod-
uct it is selling was produced by the competitor." Id. Both types of passing off violate §43(a) of the
Lanham Act. Id.
The court also explained that §43(a) covers implied reverse passing off (in contrast to express
reverse passing off discussed in the text) where the wrongdoer simply removes or obliterates the
name of the manufacturer or source and sells the product in an unbranded state. This part of the
court's opinion suggests a rejection of the traditional rule that a creator is not entitled to credit for his
work absent a contrary contractual provision. See supra note 11-12; Kwall, supra note 5, at n. 72.
44. Id.
45. Id. The court concluded by noting that "in the film industry, a particular actor's performance,
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because it involves an attempt to misappropriate or profit from another's talents
and workmanship.46
The Ninth Circuit followed these same policies, namely, ensuring that the
producer of a good or service receives appropriate recognition and that the
consuming public receives full information about the origin of the good, in
Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp.47 In Lamothe, plaintiff songwriters, Robert
Lamothe and Ronald Jones, co-authored two songs with one of the defendants,
Robinson Crosby, while they were all in the same band.4" Crosby later joined
the band RATT which released an album containing both songs attributing
authorship to Crosby and another person. Lamothe and Jones did not received
credit for either song.' Relying on Smith, the court reversed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff finding that Lamothe and
Jones had stated an express reverse passing off claim under §43(a)." The court
found that attributing authorship to less than all of the joint authors constituted a
false designation of origin because it is "the economic equivalent of passing off
one person's product under the name or mark of another."52
In a footnote, the Lamothe court anticipated a limitation on the reverse
passing off doctrine in the context of false attribution cases where the work
which omits an author's name is not the same as the original work the author
created. 3 This limitation was expressly addressed two years later in Shaw v.
Lindheim,' where the Ninth Circuit refused to extend the reverse passing off
doctrine to a situation where defendant credited himself as the creator of a tele-
vision series substantially similar but not identical to one depicted in a script
written by the plaintiff.55 The court stated that although it had never directly
which may have received an award or other critical acclaim, may be the primary attraction to
moviegoers. Some actors are said to have such drawing power at the box office that the appearance
of their names on the theater marquee can almost guarantee financial success. Such big box office
names are built, in part, through being prominently featured in popular films and by receiving ap-
propriate recognition in film credits and advertising. Since actor's fees for pictures, and indeed their
ability to get any work at all, is often based on the drawing power their name may be expected to
have at the box office, being accurately credited for films in which they have played would seem to
be of critical importance in enabling actors to sell their "services," i.e., their performances". Id.
46. Id.
47. 847 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988).
48. Id. at 1405.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1406.
52. Id. at 1407-1408.
53. The court noted in footnote 1: "The plaintiffs do not dispute that the recorded versions of [the
two songs] are not identical to the compositions that they helped create. But the defendants do not
allege that the recorded versions of these songs are so substantially different from the versions co-
authored by Lamothe and Jones that they may not be considered the same product. We express no
opinion whether the Lanham Act incorporates a "substantial similarity" requirement." For purposes of
the appeal, the court assumed that the recorded versions differed only in minor detail from the origi-
nal co-authored compositions. Id. at 1405, n. 1.
54. 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
55. Id. at 1364. Although the court upheld the grant of summary judgment against plaintiff as to
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addressed the issue of whether reverse passing off claims may be recognized in
situations where the works are substantially similar, it refused to extend the
reverse passing off doctrine beyond situations of "bodily appropriation," that is,
where the wrongdoer has not made a straight substitution of names on plaintiff's
entire work.56 The court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was not consistent
with the Lanham Act's purpose of preventing individuals from misleading the
public by placing their competitor's work forward as their own. In spite of the
similarities between the two works, the court felt likelihood of consumer
confusion was minimal. 7
2. Author's Name is Placed on Work Which He Did Not Create
Another situation in which §43(a) may be applied to protect a creator's right
of paternity is where his name is used on a work which he did not create. The
fact patterns in this area commonly involve an author who has contributed to the
creation of the work, however, the attribution given to him inaccurately repre-
sents this contribution. In this situation, although an author or creator may have
had some involvement in the work, it would be false or misleading to use her
name to indicate that she was the primary author or creator.
This situation has arisen in the music industry on more than one occasion. 8
The first was in Yameta v. Capital Records, Inc.,59 where Yameta Co. and sing-
er Jimi Hendrix were granted a preliminary injunction based on §43(a) prohibit-
ing Capital Records from selling and advertising a certain album promoting
Hendrix as the featured player.'" The album in dispute contained songs sung by
Curtis Knight with guitar accompaniment by Hendrix. At the time of the release
of the album, Hendrix was a well-known and popular musician.6' The title
which appeared on the jacket cover was, "Get that Feeling: Jimi Hendrix Plays
and Curtis Knight Sings." The words "plays" and "sings" appeared in much
his 43(a) claim, it did find that plaintiff had a claim for copyright infringement because an issue of
fact existed as to whether the defendant's pilot script for the television series 'The Equalizer' was
substantially similar to plaintiffs script of the same title. Id. at 1363.
56. Id. at 1364. The court concluded that Smith limited reverse passing off to two situations:
Reverse passing off is accomplished 'expressly' when the wrongdoer removes the name or
trademark on another party's product and sells that product under the name chosen by the
wrongdoer. 'Implied' reverse passing off occurs when the wrongdoer simply removes or
otherwise obliterates the name of the manufacturer or source and sells the product in an
unbranded state."
Id. The court concluded that neither of these possibilities are applicable where the products at issue
are substantially similar but not identical. Id.
57. Id.
58. See also, Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)(granting injunction to singer
Charlie Rich and CBS records under §43(a) prohibiting RCA from distributing an album of songs re-
corded by Rich ten to fourteen years earlier where RCA had packaged the album with a contempo-
rary picture of Rich and insufficient notice to the consuming public of the time period during which
the songs were recorded).
59. 279 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
60. Id. at 587.
61. Id. at 586.
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smaller type.62 The cover of the album also featured a photograph of Hendrix
alone in which he appeared to be singing. Hendrix's name appeared in consider-
ably larger letters than Knight's, and further stood out because of the colors
used.' The court concluded that despite the technically accurate statement that
"Jimi Hendrix plays," the cover of the album tended to falsely describe its con-
tents and was therefore violative of §43(a).'
Similarly, in Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp.' , noted jazz guitar-
ist and singer George Benson brought an action under §43(a) to enjoin distribu-
tion and sale of an album. The album involved in the dispute contained material
from a recording session held years earlier when Benson was an unknown
musician. At that recording session, Benson was merely a member of a group.
He had no input as to the style, content or production of the music.' Defen-
dants, the composers at the recording session, remixed and marketed the material
as a collection entitled "George Benson, Erotic Moods."'67 The front cover of
the record jacket featured a large recent photograph of Benson and prominently
displayed his name alone in bold letters.' Defendants had altered the contents
of the original recording, accenting Benson's guitar track, and had "over-dubbed"
the sexually suggestive moaning of a woman on one selection. The caption, "X
Rated LP," appeared below the title.69 The court found the defendant's attribu-
tion false and misleading in violation of §43(a) because it was likely to harm
Benson's reputation, mislead the public, and hurt the sale of future Benson
albums."
Similar fact patterns have arisen in the context of literary works as illustrated
in Follett v. Arbor House Publishing where Ken Follett sought to prevent his
attribution as primary author on a book which he had edited extensively.7 The
series of events which led to the dispute began in 1977 when Follett was hired
by a foreign publishing agent to rework an English translation of a French book
by Rene Louis Maurice,7 It was agreed that Follett would rework the story by
restructuring the story, bringing style to writing, exploiting the drama, developing
the characters and filling in the gaps." The book entitled Heist of the Century
was published in England with the attribution of "Rene Louis Maurice with Ken
Follett" on the title page in 1978.' 4
62. Id. at 584.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 586.
65. 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
66. Id. at 517.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 518. See also Rich, supra note 58.
71. 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
72. Id. at 306. Rene Louis Maurice is the pseudonym for the three French journalists who col-
laborated on writing the French version of the book.
73. Id.
74. Originally Follett had insisted on a copyright in his rewrite, however this matter was later
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Subsequently, Follett authored two best sellers published by Arbor House and
achieved international fame. 5 After Follett ceased his association with Arbor
House and joined the New American Library Company, Arbor House acquired
the American rights to The Heist of the Century.6 Arbor House changed the
title to The Gentlemen of 16 July, and prepared to release it at the same time
New American scheduled the release of Follett's new novel, Key to Rebecca."
Arbor House intended to promote The Gentlemen of 16 July by exploiting
Follett's editorial participation as that of an author." This was to be
accomplished by attributing authorship on the book's cover as "by the author of
TRIPLE and EYE OF THE NEEDLE, KEN FOLLEIT with Rene Louis
Maurice." Only Follett's name was to appear on the spine portion of the book
jacket 9 Follett filed suit to enjoin Arbor House from publishing the book and
using the authorship attribution in a false and misleading manner.'
In framing the issue to be resolved, the court stated that the controlling
question was whether the attribution to Ken Follett as the principal author on the
cover of the Gentlemen of 16 July constitutes a violation of §43(a) as a false
representation and false designation of origin." The court explained that in or-
der to determine whether a description or representation is false, a court should
first assess the meaning of particular representations and then determine whether
the claims are false." Where a description concerning goods is unambiguous,
the court can grant relief based on its own findings of falsity without resort to
evidence of the reaction of consumers of the goods." Moreover, in order to
obtain injunctive relief under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff need only establish a
likelihood of confusion or tendency to mislead.'
The court first found that the attribution unambiguously indicated that Follett
was the principal author of the book." The difficult issue for the court was the
determination of whether this attribution was false or misleading. In order to
make this determination, the court endeavored to define the concept of author-
ship. It found that despite Follett's substantial contribution to the work," it was
dropped by Follett. Id. at 307.
75. Id.; Verbit, supra note 7, at 596.
76. Follett, 497 F. Supp. at 306.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 308.
80. Id. at 305.
81. Id. at 311.
82. Id. at 312 (citing American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 164-
167 (2d Cir. 1978).
83. Id. (citing American Brands, Inc. v. J.R. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1356
(S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
84. Id. (citing American Brands, Inc.. 413 F. Supp. at 1356; Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 283
F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
85. Id. at 312.
86. The court made the following observation regarding Follett's contribution:
The actual words used in the final draft were supplied in large measure by Follett. Follett
altered the method of telling the story by shifting the chronology, and removing the
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not sufficient to render him the principal author of the book. The court stated:
"Authorship connotes something more than style, form and narrative approach. It
includes a special element of creativity, of definition of scope and content.
Almost every significant occurrence, personality and theme can be traced directly
to the materials from which Follett worked."' From this analysis the court
concluded that the designation of Follett as the principal author was literally false
and it did not need to reach the issue of consumer confusion8s
In these cases, primary authorship was attributed to the musicians and an
author who had not actually created the works. For the most part, §43(a) was
effectively used to protect the creator's right of paternity in not having their
name used in a way to suggest that they were the primary creators. An author's
interest in not being linked to someone else's work is closely connected to an
author's interest in not having her work distorted.89 In both situations, the au-
thor wants to have disseminated as her own only those works that she herself has
created or whose distribution she has authorized.' The next section discusses
protection of an author's integrity right when his name is used on his work after
it has been distorted or altered in some fashion.
B. Protection of the Right of Integrity
As discussed earlier,91 the right of integrity prevents others from distorting,
mutilating, or modifying a work in a manner that would injure the author's honor
and reputation. In context of §43(a), it appears that an author can only protect
her right of integrity to prevent others from distorting or mutilating her work by
enforcing her §43(a) paternity right to be free from false attribution of author-
ship.' For example, when a work is extensively edited by another, attribution to
the original author of the work may become actionable under §43(a) as a false
designation of origin. That is, the edited work is not the original author's work
and it would be false to represent to the public that it was. However, this
protection of the integrity right through the paternity right under §43(a) is
limited. This is because an author will have no cause of action for misrepresen-
tation if the altered version of the work bears a disclaimer or otherwise
flashbacks. The characters were more vividly portrayed in Follett's edited version than in
the draft he received. Follett has modulated the unfolding events carefully in order to
achieve... "narrative drive" and to enhance the dramatic effect of the plot. Follett's
contribution bears certain indicia of authorship. His alterations were substantial, and the
finished product bears the mark of his style and craftsmanship.
Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. GOLDsTEIN. supra note 8 at §15.24.2.3.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 14-15 for discussion of integrity right.
92. Comment, supra note 35, at 623. See Goldsmith v. Main Line Book Co., 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(court refused to dismiss author's §43(a) claim against publishing house which
published an abridged softcover version of author's book in violation of a licensing agreement and
attributed authorship of the shortened version to the original author).
15
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accurately indicates the extent of the original author's contributions to the altered
work.93 This situation commonly arises in the context of derivative works where
an author has authorized another to create a new work based upon the artist's
original work. If the author of the derivative work accurately represents that it is
"based upon" the original work or otherwise indicates the original author's
contribution, there is no §43(a) violation. The following discussion examines the
application of §43(a) to vindicate integrity rights through paternity rights where a
modified work bears the name of the original author.
1. Author's Name is Used in Connection with an Altered Work
An author's interest in the integrity of his work was explicitly recognized in
the landmark case of Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, where the
plaintiffs successfully claimed that the broadcast of their original work as their
own work after it had been extensively edited by the defendant violated
§43(a).9' Monty Python, a group of British performers and writers who gained
popularity through a television comedy series entitled "Monty Python's Flying
Circus," sought an injunction against the broadcast by ABC of their shows.95
Originally the shows had been written and performed for the British
Broadcasting Company (BBC) under a scriptwriters' agreement which gave
Monty Python considerable control over the scripts of the shows.' BBC was
authorized to license the transmission of unaltered recordings of the television
93. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at §15.24.2.3.
94. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
95. Id. at 17.
96. Id. The agreement provided:
When script alterations are necessary it is the intention of the BBC to make every effort to
inform and to reach agreement with the writer. Whenever practicable any necessary alter-
ations (other than minor alterations) shall be made by the Writer. Nevertheless the BBC
shall at all times have the right to make (a) minor alterations and (b) such other alterations
as in its opinion are necessary in order to avoid involving the BBC in legal action or
bringing the BBC into disrepute. Any decision under (b) shall be made at a level not
below that of the Head of the Department. It is however agreed that after a script has been
accepted by the BBC, alterations will not be made by the BBC under (b) above unless (i)
the Writer, if available when the BBC requires the alterations to be made, has been asked
to agree to them but is not willing to do so and (ii) the Writer has had, if he so requests
and if the BBC agrees that time permits if rehearsals and recording are to proceed as
planned, an opportunity to be represented by the Writer's Guild of Great Britain (or if he
is not a member of the Guild, by his agent) at a meeting with the BBC to be held within
at most 48 hours of the request (excluding weekends). If in such circumstances there is no
agreement about the alterations then the final decision shall rest with the BBC. Apart from
the right to make alterations under (a) and (b) above the BBC shall not without the con-
sent of the Writer or his agent (which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld) make
any structural alterations as opposed to minor alterations to the script, provided that such
consent shall not be necessary in any case where the Writer is for any reason not immedi-
ately available for consultation at the time which in the BBC's opinion is the deadline
from the production point of view for such alterations to be made if rehearsals and record-
ing are to proceed as planned.
Id., n. 2.
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shows overseas, but all other rights were reserved by Monty Python.97 BBC
assigned the distribution rights to Time-Life Films who in turn granted ABC the
right to broadcast and rebroadcast six Monty Python shows as two ninety-minute
nationwide television specials, each comprised of three of the original thirty-
minute programs.9" ABC edited the programs extensively by cutting out twenty-
four of the original ninety minutes of recording." Monty Python perceived
these cuts as mutilation of their work and sought an injunction against the
broadcast of the second special."°
In reversing the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, the Court-of
Appeals for the Second Circuit first held that ABC had committed copyright
infringement.'' The court found that the recorded programs were derivative
works taken from the scripts in which Monty Python had retained a common law
copyright. 2 The court stated, "one who obtains permission to use a copy-
righted script in the production of a derivative work, however, may not exceed
the specific purpose for which permission was granted."'0 3 Since the contract
between Monty Python and BBC did not specifically grant to BBC the right to
edit the programs once they had been recorded, BBC could not grant to ABC
rights which it did not possess." Therefore, ABC's extensive editing exceeded
the scope of any license that BBC was entitled to grant and constituted copyright
infringement." 5
In the second part of the opinion, the court explicitly addressed moral rights
in the context of Monty Python's claim under §43(a) of the Lanham Act. The
court began by stating that regardless of the right ABC had to broadcast the
edited programs, it was likely that Monty Python would succeed on a theory that
the cuts "constituted an actionable mutilation of Monty Python's work."" The
link between the integrity and paternity right is illustrated by court's statement,
"[T]his cause of action, which seeks redress for deformation of an artist's work,
finds its roots in the concept ... of moral right, which may generally be
summarized as including the right of the artist to have his work attributed to him
in the form in which he created it."' 7 The court found that although the pro-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 18.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Monty Python's copyright in its unpublished script is a common law copyright rather than a
statutory copyright, which can exist only after publication. This distinction did not affect the court's
analysis. Id. at 19, n. 3.
103. Id. at 20.
104. Id. at 21; Kwall, supra note 5, at 34.
105. The court found the situation similar to one in which a user licensed to create certain deriva-
tive works from a copyrighted script infringes the copyright in the underlying work by exceeding the
medium or time restrictions of his license in the production of a derivative work. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at
20.
106. Id. at 23-24.
107. The court explained that although American copyright law does not recognize moral rights,
courts have long granted relief for the misrepresentation of an artist's work by relying on theories
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gram was correctly identified as being written and performed by Monty Python,
it was substantially different from the group's intended creation because the
truncated version at times omitted the climax of the skits to which Monty
Python's rare brand of humor was leading and at other times deleted essential
elements in the schematic development of the story line."l The court concluded
that presentation of such truncated versions as Monty Python's stated a cause of
action under §43(a).
Justice Gurfein, concurring in the court's finding regarding copyright infringe-
ment, objected to the application of §43(a) given the statute's concern with
misdescription of origin." 9 He recognized that the misdescription of origin,
necessary for a §43(a) violation, could be eliminated with an appropriate legend
to indicate that the plaintiff's had not approved the editing of the ABC
version."' Furthermore, he explained, "[I]f the plaintiffs complain that their
artistic integrity is still compromised by the distorted version, their claim does
not lie under the Lanham Act, which does not protect the copyrighted work itself
but protects only against the misdescription or mislabelling."''.
There has been agreement"' with Justice Gurfein's assessment of §43(a) and
courts have concluded that an author will have no cause of action for misrep-
resentation if the altered version of the work bears a disclaimer or otherwise
accurately indicates the extent of the author's contributions to the altered
work."3 However, the adequacy of the disclaimer or other attribution indicating
outside the statutory law of copyright. The court also recognized that although such decisions are
clothed in terms of proprietary right in one's own creation, they also properly vindicate the author's
personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form. Id. at 24;
Roeder, supra note 7, at 568. See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (contract requiring
defendant to include on records made from plaintiff's master discs that recordings were presented by
plaintiff, contained an implied duty not to sell abbreviated versions of the music which made the
required legend false; court found breach of this duty constituted breach of contract as well as the
tort of unfair competition) and Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass.
1939)(action by author of the novel "Stella Dallas" against radio broadcasting company for misap-
propriation of the title of book and character of Stella Dallas for use in its skits; court found plaintiff
may be able to prevail on a claim of unfair competition if defendant appropriated the plot and princi-
pal characters of the novel without plaintiffs consent).
108. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25.
109. Id. at 26.
110. Id. at 27.
111. Id.
112. See. CBS, Inc. v. Gusto Records, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Tenn. 1974)(in fashioning
§43(a) relief against record company who had misrepresented that its album contained recent record-
ings of plaintiff, Charlie Rich, the court concluded that an accurate statement of the a record album's
contents, if affixed in a prominent location on the album jacket, would alleviate any irreparable harm
to Rich's' reputation and popularity which may be caused by consumers attributing the deceptive
marketing of defendant's album to him); Rosenfeld v. W.B. Saunders, 728 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (mention of plaintiffs contributions in the preface to defendant's book and full-page dedication
to plaintiff mitigated against potential consumer confusion as to the true source of the work and was
analogous to the use of disclaimers to reduce consumer confusion in trademark cases under §32(l) of
the Lanham Act).
113. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at §15.24.2.
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the author's contribution to the work can become problematic. For example, in
Gilliam, the majority did not agree that a disclaimer suggested by Justice Gurfein
"could erase the indelible impression" of the edited version on television
audiences."4 In fact, one commentator has suggested that the edited special
without a disclaimer is arguably closer to the truth than the special containing the
disclaimer, as the latter may suggest that ABC determined the content of the
programs to a greater extent than it actually did.'
This section has discussed the application of §43(a) where a work is edited
extensively without permission and primary authorship is attributed to the
original author. Gilliam clearly established that §43(a) protects the author's right
of paternity and integrity, that is, the right of the artist to have his work attribut-
ed to him in the form in which he created it."6 However, as Justice Gurfein's
concurrence suggests, this right may not be extended under §43(a) when the
attribution to an author accurately describes the author's contribution or
participation in the altered work."7 This next section focuses on the use of a
"based upon" attribution in connection with an altered work as means of
accurately crediting the author of the original work.
2. Use of the "Based Upon" Credit on an Altered Work
The cases prior to King which have addressed the use of a "based upon"
credit in the context of §43(a) have concluded that the use of words such as
114. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25, n. 13. The court's note stated in full:
Judge Gurfein's concurring opinion suggests that since the gravamen of a complaint under
the Lanham Act is that the original goods had been falsely described, a legend disclaiming
Monty Python's approval of the edited version would preclude violation of that Act. We
are doubtful that a few words could erase the indelible impression that is made by a tele-
vision broadcast, especially since the viewer has no means of comparing the truncated ver-
sion with the complete work in order to determine for himself the talents of the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, a disclaimer such as the one originally such as the one originally suggested
by Judge Lasker in the exigencies of an impending broadcast last December, would go
unnoticed by viewers who tuned into the broadcast a few minutes after it began.
We therefore conclude that Judge Gurfein's proposal that the district court could find
some form of disclaimer would be sufficient might not provide appropriate relief.
115. Comment, supra note 35, at 627. This issue arose in the recent case of Lish v. Harper's Mag-
azine Foundation, 25 U.S.P.Q. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), where the court concluded that the evidence
did not support a claim under §43(a) where defendant published a letter authored by Gordon Lish
without his permission after deleting 48% of the original text and without indicating deletions with
ellipses. The court first found that the published letter was accurately described in an introduction as
being "from a letter by Gordon Lish." It based this finding on the fact that the published letter did
originate with Lish, the person to whom it is attributed, and, although substantial deletions were
made, the published version was taken in its entirety from the original-no words were added, no
phrases changed. Since the attribution was accurate on its face, the court addressed the issue of con-
sumer confusion and found that Lish had not carried his burden to prove, despite the accurate attribu-
tion, "a false message was communicated to a not insubstantial portion of Harper's readers." Id. at
1106.
116. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
117. Id. at 26.
1993]
19
Hardy: The Protection of Moral Rights Through Section 43(a) of the Lanha
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW
"based upon" or "derived from" may be sufficient to negate any false
designation or description that otherwise may be present. For example, in Hospi-
tal for Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theater,"' the plaintiff owned the
copyright in the play "Peter Pan or the Boy Who Would Not Grow Up.""' 9 The
court found copyright infringement on the part of the defendants who had
authored and presented "Peter Pan The Magical Musical" without obtaining a
license for the production of the play from the plaintiffs."2 The court also
found that defendants had attempted to pass off their own work as the original
play "Peter Pan" by using the same title. The court concluded that use of the
words "Peter Pan" in the title of the defendants' work, and in their advertise-
ments, was very likely to create confusion. The court noted that some of the
advertising materials included the phrase "based on" or otherwise indicated the
work was a different version of the original work. Relying on Geisel, the
court concluded that the use of words such as "based on" or "derived from" may
be sufficient to negate any false designation or description that may otherwise be
present." Accordingly, defendants' failure to consistently use such disclaimers
and language of attribution warranted a Lanham Act violation.
Until King, however, the cases which have discussed the use of a "based
upon" attribution to dispel false or misleading representations under §43(a) have
not considered the situation where the "based upon" attribution itself constitutes
a false or misleading representation. Since an essential element of a §43(a) action
is that defendant's statement or claim must be false or misleading, the meaning
of the phrase "based upon" must be ascertained before determining if its use in
connection with a work is false. This resembles the inquiry made in Follett
where the court endeavored to determine the meaning of "author" before
118. 516 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1980).
119. Id. at 70.
120. Id. at 72.
121. 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)(where the court denied injunctive relief to Geisel. author
of Dr. Seuss Books, against the use of the label "Merry Menagerie based on Liberty Magazine Illus-
trations by Dr. Seuss" on dolls resembling Dr. Seuss characters stating that, "The Lanham Act does
not prohibit a commercial rival's truthfully denominating his goods a copy of a design in the public
domain, though he uses the name of the designer to do so").(emphasis added)
122. See Landon v. Twentieth Century Fox, 384 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Landon. the
plaintiff sold the motion picture rights to her book, Anna and the King of Siam, to Twentieth Century
Fox who produced thirteen films which were broadcast on the CBS Television Network as a weekly
serial entitled Anna and the King and was advertised as "based on" plaintiff's book. In addition to a
copyright claim alleging that defendant exceeded their licensing agreement by making a motion pic-
ture intended for first run on television rather than in theaters, plaintiff brought a claim sounding in
tort for the wrongful attribution of credit to her for the series which "mutilated" her literary property
as well as for other tortious conduct. Id. at 452. She was unhappy with the attribution because she
felt her book was a serious literary work concerned with the struggle for human rights, whereas the
television series was light in tone, and punctuated with bursts of dubbed laughter from the audience.
Id. at 459. The court rejected her claim stating that "Even without permission from an author.., any
person may truthfully state that a work is "based on" or "suggested by" the work of that author. Id.
Furthermore, the contract between the parties required Fox to give her appropriate credit "for her
contribution to the literary material upon which such motion pictures shall have been based." Id.
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determining whether it was false or misleading to attribute Follett with primary
authorship."
King is the first case to articulate any type of standard for determining when a
"based upon" attribution is accurate for purposes of §43(a). 24 In this case
Stephen King sued to prohibit the use of his name "on or in connection with" the
movie "The Lawnmower Man" which drew in some material respects from a ten
page story written by him."u King contended that use of his name in (i) a
possessory credit, describing the movie as "Stephen King's Lawnmower Man,"
and (ii) a "based upon" credit, representing that the movie was "based upon" a
short story by King, falsely designated him as the originator of the movie. In its
review of the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit
held that the movie draws in sufficiently material respects on the short story in
qualitative and quantitative aspects and thus the use of the "based upon" credit
was justified."
King wrote his ten page story, "The Lawnmower Man," in 1970. It was
published in 1975."w The story involves a man named Harold Parkette who
neglects his lawn after his regular lawnboy mows over a cat. Parkette hires a
new man to mow his lawn who turns out to be a cleft-footed, obese and vile
agent of the pagan god Pan. This lawnmower man can move the mower psycho-kinetically."
After starting the lawnmower, the lawnmower man removes his clothing and
crawls after the running mower on his hands and knees, eating both grass and a
mole that the mower has run over. Parkette who is watching in horror, calls the
police."n Using his psychokinetic powers, however, the lawnmower man di-
rects the lawnmower after Parkette, who is chopped up by the lawnmower's
blades after being chased through the house."3 The story ends with the dis-
covery by the police of Parkette's entrails in the birdbath behind the home.'
In 1978, King assigned to Great Fantastic Picture Corporation the motion
picture and television rights for the short story.' The assignment agreement
allowed the assignee broad discretion to deal with the short story as it may think
123. See supra text accompanying notes 81- 84. The court in Follett stated, "Section 43(a) is de-
signed to provide a statutory cause of action for false description or advertisement of goods by any
person likely to be injured by such description or advertising. In order to determine whether a de-
scription or representation is false, a court should first assess the meaning of particular representa-
tions and then determine whether the claims made are false .... The concept of authorship is elusive
and inexact. Although I do not presuppose to offer some definitive analysis of qualities which give
rise to authorship, some such definition is essential to the resolution of the issue before the court"
497 F. Supp. at 304 (emphasis added).
124. 976 F.2d 824.
125. Id. at 826.
126. Id. at 830.
127. Id. at 826.
128. Id. "Psychokinetically" means by the sheer force of the mind.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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fit. 3 In return, King received an interest in the profits of each film based upon
the short story. In 1990, Great Fantastic transferred its rights under the
assignment agreement to Allied who commissioned a screenplay for a feature
length film entitled "The Lawnmower Man."'" Soon after filming of the movie
began, Allied licensed New Line to distribute the movie in North America.
The movie involves a Dr. Angelo. Experimenting with chimpanzees, he
develops technology, based on "Virtual Reality" computer simulation, which
allows a chimp to enter a three-dimensional computer environment simulating
various action scenarios.'35 Dr. Angelo hopes to adapt the technology for hu-
man use, with the ultimate goal of accelerating and improving human intelli-
gence.'36 Eventually, Dr. Angelo begins experimenting with his technology on
Jobe, who mows lawns in Dr. Angelo's neighborhood and who is referred to as
"the lawnmower man."'37 Jobe, a normal-looking young man, is simple and
possesses a childlike mentality. Dr. Angelo is able greatly to increase Jobe's
intellect with Virtual Reality. However, the experiment spins out of control, with
Jobe becoming hostile and violent as his intelligence and mental abilities become
super-human.' In the build-up to the movies climax, Jobe employs his newly
acquired psychokinetic powers to chase Dr. Angelo's neighbor, Harold Parkette,
through his house with a running lawnmower, and to kill him. The police
discover the dead man's remains in the bird bath behind his home, and, in the
climax of the movie, Dr. Angelo destroys Jobe.'39
The district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the use of both
the possessory and "based upon" credits."4 The district court concluded that
the "based upon" credit was misleading and likely to cause confusion to the
public, reasoning in essence that the "climatic scene from the short story is
inserted into the film in a manner wholly unrelated to the plot of the film," and
that the credit "grossly exaggerates" the relationship between the short story and
the film.'4'
The Second Circuit, reviewing this conclusion de novo 42 found that the
133. Id. The agreement included the rights
(i) to write film treatments [and] scripts and other dialogue versions of all descriptions
of the [short story] and at all times to add to[,] take from[,] usel,] alter[,] adapt ... and
change the [short story] and the title[,] characters[,] plot[,] theme[,] dialogue[,] sequences
and situations thereof...
(ii) to make or produce films of all kinds... incorporating or based upon the [short
story] or any part or parts thereof or any adaption thereof.
Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 827.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 828.
141. Id. at 829.
142. The weighing of factors in the ultimate determination of the likelihood of confusion is a legal
issue subject to de novo review. Id.
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district court had applied the wrong legal standard in so heavily weighing the
proportion of the film attributable to the short story in the course of finding the
"based upon" credit to be misleading and confusing.'43 The court looked to
copyright law for guidance in articulating the proper standard. It explained that
in a case of alleged copyright infringement, "[I]t has long been appropriate to
examine the quantitative and qualitative degree to which the allegedly infringed
work has been borrowed from, and not simply the proportion of the allegedly in-
fringing work that is made up of, the copyrighted material."'" In other words,
under copyright law, there is infringement when the defendant takes all of
plaintiff's work even if defendant adds much of his own material.
Although the court looked to the copyright law in determining that the lower
court had applied the wrong standard in analyzing the "based upon" credit, it
went on to articulate its own standard, stating, "Where a movie draws in material
respects from a literary work, both quantitatively and qualitatively, a "based
upon" credit should not be viewed as misleading absent persuasive countervailing
facts and circumstances."'4 The court concluded that when the resemblances
between the short story and the film were considered together, they establish that
the film draws in sufficiently material respects from the short story in both
qualitative and quantitative aspects.'"
The court rejected King's suggestion that Allied's treatment of the short story
was analogous to ABC's editing in Gilliam.47 At issue in Gilliam were original
Monty Python programs which were edited by ABC and rebroadcast as Monty
Python's original work.4 ' In referring to its opinion in Gilliam, the court stat-
ed, "We specifically noted that Monty Python was being 'present[ed] to the pub-
lic as the creator of a work not [its] own, and [made] subject to criticism for
work [it] has not done."'49 The court concluded that Gilliam was not helpful in
evaluating the accuracy of a "based upon" credit, which by definition deals with
altered and derivative works. In other words, by using a "based upon" credit,
King was held out not as the creator of the film, but as a contributor. Further-
more, the film was not held out as King's original work, but as an altered or de-
rivative work based upon King's short story.
King's claim was unique, for it did not fit under the theories which have in
the past offered protection of paternity and integrity rights under §43(a). Under
143. Id.
144. Id. at 829-830. The court cites Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S 539, 565-566
(1984) for this proposition. However, the following passage from Harper creates ambiguity on this
point:
... the fact that a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evi-
dence of the qualitative value of the copied material, both to the originator and to the
plagiarist who seeks to profit from marketing someone else's copyrighted expression.
145. Id. at 830.
146. Id. at 830.
147. Id. at 830-831.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Gilliam. 538 F.2d at 24).
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these theories, an author may protect his right of paternity under a reverse
passing off when his work is sold bearing a name other than his own.I"e An
author may also bring a §43(a) claim to protect his paternity right when an
authorship attribution misrepresents his contribution to the work.' This situa-
tion most commonly arises when primary authorship is attributed to a well
known author who had minimal involvement in the actual authorship of the
work. Additionally, if an author's work is edited or altered so that it would be
false or misleading to attribute the altered work to the original author, §43(a)
may be invoked to protect the authors right of integrity and paternity.' How-
ever, if the altered work accurately credits the original author using a "based
upon" attribution, §43(a) does not apply under King.' The Second Circuit's
decision in King is consistent with the case law discussed above and illustrates
how §43(a) is quite limited in its protection of "the right of the artist to have his
work attributed to him in the form in which he created it," as identified by Jus-
tice Gurfein in his Gilliam concurrence. There is no false or misleading represen-
tation as required by §43(a) where a disclaimer or an attribution like a "based
upon" credit accurately indicated the author'§ contribution to the work. The next
section examines the Second Circuit's analysis in determining whether the "based
upon" credit used on the "Lawnmower Man" was accurate.
III. ANALYsIs
When an author who owns the copyright in his work sells his derivative rights
to another, that person may, unless the contract provides otherwise, make a
derivative work based upon the original copyrighted work and may use the
original author's name on the derivative workM as long as that use is not false
or misleading under §43(a). However, as was the case with King, the author of
the preexisting work may decide that he does not want his name used in
connection with the derivative work in certain situations. Not all credit is
flattering or positive in the eyes of the original author and frequently the author
would prefer not to be associated with the other work. 55 However, absent a
contractual provision to the contrary, if the use of the author's name accurately
represents that the work is "based upon", "taken from" or "derived from" the
author's work, the author may not use §43(a) to object despite her personal
displeasure with the use of her name." There can be no false or misleading
representation or consumer confusion if the attribution is accurate. Indeed, it may
be false or misleading or likely to confuse consumers if credit is not given to the
150. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 58-90.
152. See supra notes 91-117 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 5.
155. Ross, supra note 4, at 376.
156. Id. at 376; Comment, supra note 35, at 458; Landon, 384 F.Supp. at 459 (even without per-
mission from an author or the existence of a written agreement with him, any person may truthfully
state that a work is "based on" or "suggested by" the work of that author).
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author of the underlying work.
This legal framework leaves little room for the paternity and integrity rights
of the artist to prevent the use of his name on the derivative work. Because
moral rights are not expressly protected in the United States outside of
§106A, 57 the court in King really had no other choice but to decide the case in
accord with §43(a) at the expense of King's paternity and integrity rights to
prevent the use of his name on a modified version of his work. Thus, an artist in
King's position cannot find substitute moral rights protection through §43(a) in
the face of the conflicting interests that the derivative artist has in modifying the
original work and that the public has in knowing the source of the work. The last
section of this article examines the standard the court used to determine the
accuracy of the "based upon" credit and how this standard affects the viability of
§43(a) as a vehicle for the protection of moral rights.
A. "Based Upon" Standard
The court rejected an approach which focused on the proportion of the film
which came from the story, suggesting that it was contrary to copyright
principles.'58 However, after noting that it was appropriate under copyright
infringement analysis to look at the proportion of the underlying work taken by
the infringing work, the court articulated its own standard without further
reference to copyright law or other authority. Apparently, the court was less
concerned with articulating a test similar to the copyright test and more
concerned with the possibility that under the first approach "substantially all of a
work could be taken and, if unrelated ideas, themes, and scenes are tacked on or
around the extracted work, a "based upon" credit would be deemed
misleading."'59
The standard the court adopted involves two components. The first is a deter-
mination of whether the movie draws in material respects from the literary work,
both quantitatively and qualitatively. If it does, the court may find that the movie
is "based upon" the literary work and that the credit is not misleading."w
Conversely, although not discussed in the opinion, it seems that if the film did
not draw in material respects from the literary work, the "based upon" credit
would be viewed as false and misleading. Second, even if the film draws in
material respects from the literary work, the plaintiff may still be successful
under a §43(a) claim if persuasive countervailing facts and circumstances
indicating that the "based upon" standard is misleading are present.' This part
of the test offers the plaintiff an opportunity to bring evidence to the court's
attention which weighs against a finding that the credit is accurate and not mis-
leading. Although the court's standard is easy to articulate, the opinion does not
157. See supra note 18.
158. King, 976 F.2d at 829.
159. Id. at 830.
160. Id
161. Id.
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offer much guidance regarding its application in other cases. As for the second
part of the test, the court did not specifically state what "persuasive countervail-
ing facts or circumstances" might render a "based upon" credit misleading even
when the film draws in material respects from the literary work. However,
reference to the fact that there was no evidence of industry or public confusion
over the credit, suggests that the industry or public reaction to it may constitute
countervailing facts and circumstances." Perhaps a plaintiff could introduce
survey evidence which indicates that when a moviegoers sees a "based upon"
credit, they think the movie is for the most part representative of what happens
in the book. Additionally, the manner in which the credit was displayed could
render an otherwise accurate credit misleading. For example, where the "based
upon" is in very small letter and the author's name is in very big or brightly
colored letters. 63
More problematic for future application of the standard is the first part of the
test. The court did not explain what "draws in material respects" or "qualitative
and quantitative" means other than to note that the "core" of King's story
appeared in the movie."6 According to the court, the core of the story was the
scene where the "lawnmower man" uses his psychokinetic powers to kill another
character after chasing him through his house with a lawnmower." s The court
noted other similarities between the works which include: the police find the
remains of the victim in the bird bath; the victim's name is Harold Parkette in
both works; the police officers have the same names and engage in similar
conversation; the lawnmower appears as described in the book." Although
elements of the story were not in the film and elements of the film were not in
the story, the court was satisfied that the resemblances between the works when
taken together established that the film drew in material respects in both
qualitative and quantitative aspects. 67
This analysis does not offer much guidance on how much of the plaintiff's
work the defendant has to take to fall within the standard articulated by the
court. Must the core of the story, as was the case in King, be taken for the film
to draw in material respects from the story or is it just strong evidence? A look
at the interpretation of the phrase "based upon" in the context of copyright and
contract law may offer some assistance in interpreting the first part of the
standard.
Under the Copyright Act, the definition of a derivative work is dependant on
an interpretation of the phrase "based upon." The Act defines a derivative work
as one that "represents an original work of authorship" but is "based upon one or
more preexisting works."'" In determining whether a derivative work is based
162. Id.
163. Yameta, 279 F. Supp. at 60-65 and accompanying text (where the words "plays" and "sings"
appeared in much smaller letters than performers names on record album jacket).
164. King, 976 F.2d at 830.
165. Id. at 830.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Section 101 defines derivative work as:
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upon the plaintiff's work, a few courts and commentators have borrowed the
substantial similarity test from copyright infringement.169 This test seems to be
the most appropriate for determining whether a derivative work is "based upon"
the preexisting work within the meaning of §106(2), because the unauthorized
preparation of a derivative work "based upon" a copyrighted work is, in fact,
copyright infringement under the statute.' For example, under copyright law,
the film "The Lawnmower Man" is a derivative work based upon King's story if
it satisfies the substantial similarity test. Furthermore, the creators of the film
would be guilty of copyright infringement, absent their assignment agreement
with King, if there is substantial similarity.'
A plaintiff must show "substantial similarity" between the two works in order
to prove copyright infringement." There are two prongs to this determination:
copying and unlawful appropriation." Unfortunately, the term "substantial
similarity" is used under both prongs to refer to different things. 74 First, to
establish copying a plaintiff may present direct evidence of copying or he may
show access73 and "substantial similarity" between the two works, when
compared in their entirety including both protectible and unprotectible
material. 76 As the court in Stillman explained, "'substantial similarity' can re-
fer to likeness between two works sufficient to give rise to an inference, when
supported by evidence of access, that the defendant took ideas from the
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a trans-
lation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annota-
tions, elaborations , or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work
of authorship, is a derivative work.
17 U.S.C. at §101.
169. Kwall, supra note 5, at 42. For example, the court in Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc., 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982), in determining whether a defendant's movie was "based upon" a
particular book in the context of plaintiff's allegation that the movie infringed the book, invoked the
"substantial similarity" test used by the courts in deciding copyright infringement actions. The court
ultimately concluded, as a matter of law, that the film was not "based upon" the book because a
reasonable jury could not find that the two works were "substantially similar beyond the level of
generalized ideas or themes." Id. at 623.
170. Kwall, supra note 5, at 45.
171. Arguably, if the defendants exceed their assignment agreement in creating the movie, they
would have been guilty of infringement based on Gilliam, supra notes 102-106 and accompanying
text. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue see Kwall, supra note 6, at 40-47.
172. Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1187 (1990). A full discussion of the substantial simi-
larity test for copyright infringement is outside the scope of this article. This test varies between the
circuits and depending on the subject matter being protected.
173. Id. at 1193; Stillman v. Leo Bumett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (N.D.I1l. 1989).
174. Id.
175. The plaintiff may be able to introduce direct evidence of access when, for example, the work
was sent directly to the defendant or a close associate of the defendant. On the other hand, the
plaintiff may be able to establish a reasonable possibility of access when, for example, the complain-
ing work has been widely disseminated to the public. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
176. Stillman, 720 F. Supp. at 1358; 3 NIMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.03[e] at 13-55 (1988).
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plaintiff's work.""'
Substantial similarity, however, also relates to the unlawful nature of the
similarities between two works.' 7' Thus, if copying is established, the plaintiff
must establish that it rises to the level of unlawful appropriation in order to
constitute infringement. To show unlawful appropriation, the plaintiff must prove
that defendant's copying extended to plaintiff's protectible expression.'" A bi-
furcated test, first articulated in Arnstein v. Porter," is most commonly used
to prove copying and unlawful appropriation."' The copying/unlawful appropri-
ation distinction reflects the fact that the copyright laws do not protect ideas,
procedures, and concepts, but only the expression of ideas."
Courts have rejected the test for copyright infringement when interpreting the
meaning of the phrase "based upon" when used in a contract." As one court
has explained, there is no legal requirement that material must be of the
protectible type under copyright law to be the subject of a contract calling for
compensation if another creates a work based upon it. This is because a contract
creates no monopoly; it is effective only between the contracting parties; it does
177. Stillman, 720 F.Supp. at 1358.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. The following is an excerpt from Arnstein articulating its two prong test for proving copying
and unlawful appropriation:
If there is evidence of access and similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must deter-
mine whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying. On this issue, analysis ("dis-
section") is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be received to aid the trier of the
facts. If evidence of access is absent, the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the
possibility that plaintiff and defendant independently arrived at the same result. If copying
is established, then only does there arise the second issue, that of illicit copying (unlawful
appropriation). On that issue... the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer, ac-
cordingly, on that issue, "dissection" and expert testimony are irrelevant.
154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
181. In Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Productions Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977) the Ninth Circuit, building on Arnstein, articulated its own two part test. The first part of
the test is an "extrinsic" test where, through analytic dissection and expert testimony, the expression
is separated from the underlying ideas of the works. It is extrinsic because it depends on specific cri-
teria such as type of artwork involved, materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the
subject. The second part of the test is the "intrinsic" test which measures the substantial similarity in
expression depending on the response of the ordinary reasonable person. Expert testimony is not
appropriate under this part of the test. Id. at 1164.
A later Ninth Circuit case, Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990), recharacterized
the Kroff test as an objective and subjective analysis of expression. Under Lindheim, the court first
"must compare the individual features of the works to find specific similarities between the plot,
theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events .... The test focuses not on
basic plot ideas, which are not protected by copyright, but on the actual concrete elements that make
up the total sequence of events and the relationships between the major characters." Analytic dissec-
tion and expert testimony are appropriate under this part of the test. The second prong of the analysis
is a subjective judgment by the trier of fact whether two literary works are similar. Id. at 1362.
182. Stillman, 720 F.Supp. at 1358.
183. See Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 634, 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d
1497 (1990); Weitzenkom v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953); Fink v. Goodson-Todman
Enterprises, Ltd., 9 Cal. App. 3d 996, 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1970).
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not withdraw the idea from general circulation or place a restraint on progress in
art.' " These courts have applied a different standard for determining whether a
derivative work is "based upon" a preexisting work in contract disputes which is
less stringent than the standard for copyright infringement."
For example, a California court struggled with this issue in the recent case of
Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures.1" Buchwald involved the interpretation of the
phrase "based upon" in a contract between Buchwald, a writer, and Paramount
Pictures which provided that Buchwald was entitled to payment for a film
treatment only if Paramount produced "a feature length theatrical motion picture
based upon author's work.""' Since the phrase "based upon" was not defined
in the contract, the court allowed testimony by industry experts as to the specific
meaning of based upon in the entertainment industry.' Due to the divergent
opinions rendered by the experts, the court found the testimony of little value
and proceeded to articulate its own standard based on existing precedent.'
The court first noted that under copyright, infringement may be established by
showing access and substantial similarity."l However, relying on decisions in
two similar contract cases, Weitzenkorn v. Lesser 9 ' and Fink v. Goodson-
184. Fink, 9 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 88 Cal Rptr. at 689. The court in Stillman explained:
The copyright laws serve to promote the 'progress of science and the useful arts' by pro-
tecting the labors of those who create original works and thereby ensuring the profitability
of their endeavors and their willingness to bring novel ideas to the public. Too much
protection, however, would undermine the goal: If author's by publishing their works,
could remove the ideas incorporated in them from the public domain, then they could
stifle, rather than advance, the development and exploitation of new ideas. To skate the
thin line between too much and too little protection, the copyright laws have come to dis-
tinguish between the expression of ideas on the one hand, and ideas themselves on the
other. Authors may protect the former the latter remain freely available for other authors
to develop and exploit.
720 F. Supp. at 1357.
185. In Fink v. Goodson-Todman, a California court stated in the context of a contract claim:
'Based upon' does seem to be something a little different than having substantial similar-
ity to a material element or qualitatively important part.
9 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
186. 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 634, 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1497 (1990).
187. Buchwald, 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS at 20.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 21. The following are some of the definitions offered by the experts:
A movie is based upon a writer's work if it was created out of significant elements
from the underlying materials; significant elements meaning that there were character
similarities, story similarities.
Based upon means that the screen play of the motion picture had been derived from
and incorporated the elements of the author's work.
Based upon means intent.
190. Id. at 23.
191. 40 Cal. 2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953). Weitzenkorn was a breach of contract case where an
author sued defendant for use of her Tarzan/Fountain of Youth idea in a movie. Although both
plaintiff's idea and defendant's movie involved Tarzan, the court found no similarity as to the form
and manner of expression between the two works as would be required to state a claim under copy-
19931
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Todman Enterprises,"9 the court rejected Paramount's argument that the writer
had to establish that the works were substantially similar in order to prove that
the film was based upon the plaintiffs work.'93 The court concluded that Para-
mount's obligation to pay Buchwald arose if the film was "based upon a material
element of or was inspired by Buchwald's treatment."'" This determination is
to be made by searching "for points of similarity both quantitatively and
qualitatively." 95 Where the evidence of access is overwhelming, less similarity
is required. Furthermore, even if the similar material is quantitatively small, if it
is qualitatively important the trier of fact may find in plaintiff's favor." The
court then made a comparison between the points of similarities between the two
works and concluded that the movie was based upon the Buchwald's treatment.
As this brief discussion of the copyright and contract "based upon" standards
indicates, the approach used in contract cases is less stringent than copyright
because it does not require proof that protectible material was used by the
defendant. The first part of the King standard is closer to the contract standard
than the copyright standard, in that appropriation of protectible expression is not
required for a §43(a) claim either. However, the King standard may be even less
stringent than the contract standard in that the points of similarity noted by the
court in Buchwald were much more extensive than those in King. The works in
Buchwald had similar plots, characters, themes, outcomes, scenes and lessons,
where in King the only real similarity was the one scene in which the lawn-
right law. However, it did find that the similarities were sufficient to state a contract claim in the
following passage:
The charge of breach of contract, however, is dependent on the allegation that the motion
picture "is patterned upon and copies and uses" Weitzenkom's composition. If, as a matter
of law, there is no similarity whatsoever between the productions the... [contract] count
does not state a cause of action. However, although there is no similarity between
protectible portions of Weitzenkorn's composition and the defendant's production, similar-
ity may exist because of the combination of characters, locale, and myth. It is conceivable,
even though improbable, that Weitzenkorn might be able to introduce evidence tending to
show that the parties entered into an express contract whereby ... [the defendants]...
agreed to pay for her production regardless of its protectibility [under copyright law] and
no matter how slight or commonplace the portion which they used.
40 Cal. 2d at 792, 256 P.2d at 957-958.
192. 9 Cal. App. 3d 996, 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1970). In Fink, the contract between the parties obli-
gated the defendant to compensate the plaintiff if the defendant created a series "based on plaintiffs
program or any material element contained in it". Id. at 1002. The court stated that "based upon"
does seem to be something a little different than having substantial similarity to a material element or
qualitatively important part." Id. at 1008. The court stated that a material element could range from a
mere basic theme up to an extensively elaborated idea, depending on what might be proved as the
concept of the parties. Id. at n.15. The court noted that its "based upon any material element" test
was quite close to the concept of "inspiration for" in Minniear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App.2d 495, 505, 72
Cal. Rptr. 287, 294 (1968)(holding that enough similarities existed for a jury to infer that plaintiff's
"ideas and format were the inspiration for" defendants work for an implied contract count). Id.
193. Buchwald, 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS at *26.
194. Id. at *29.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *31.
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mower runs through the house killing a character named Harold Parkette.197 In
King, the court focused on how much of King's story, quantitatively and
qualitatively, was taken for use in the film. The court was not concerned that the
story was inserted into a film which had a dramatically different plot, theme and
cast of characters and rejected any focus on similarities between each work in
their entirety.
One commentator has written that although the phrase "based upon" may
appear self-explanatory, application of the phrase in the context of copyright law
is difficult because it requires a determination of the degree of creative liberty
that is allowed by one who transforms a pre-exiting work into another
medium.1 This same difficulty is encountered in the context of §43(a) where
the issue is, how much creative liberty should be allowed with the underlying
work before a "based upon" attribution to the original author is false, misleading
or likely to confuse. The less stringent the standard, the more creative liberties
on the part of the adapter will be tolerated by courts."' In the context of §43(a)
where false or misleading representations and consumer confusion is the focus,
the King court chose a less stringent standard for the first part of its test. As the
court indicated, it was concerned that if did not adopt a standard which focused
on the proportion of the underlying work taken, an entire literary work could be
taken for use in a film and, if unrelated ideas, themes, and scenes are tacked on
or around the extracted work, a "based upon" credit would be deemed
misleading. However, although the court's inquiry into how much of the under-
lying work has been taken is not as stringent as copyright or contract standards,
this may not always be to a defendant's advantage given the fact that the
plaintiff is afforded an opportunity later to present "countervailing facts and
circumstances" indicating that the credit is misleading.
As illustrated by the discussion above, the standard for determining whether a
work is "based upon" another is different depending on the context in which it is
used. Initially, one may think that a uniform standard for interpreting the phrase
under §43(a), copyright and contract law may be appropriate since authors often
197. The court in Buchwald agreed with the following comparison between the two works made
by plaintiff's counsel:
Both are modem day comedies. The protagonist is a young black member of royalty from
a mythical African kingdom, pampered and extremely wealthy, well-educated. They both
come to a large city on the American East Coast. And they arrive as a fish out of water
from this foreign kingdom. Abruptly, finding themselves without royal trappings of money
and power, they end up in the black, urban American ghetto, about as far culturally as
they could ever hope to be from their pampered, royal status in their mythical kingdom.
Each character abandons his regal attitudes. Both live in the ghetto as poor blacks experi-
encing the realities of Ghetto life. Each takes a menial job as (sic) a series of harrowing
and comedic adventures in the ghetto, is humanized and enriched by his experiences. Love
always triumphing over all, each meets and falls in love with a beautiful young American
woman who he will marry and make his queen and live happily ever after in his mythical
African kingdom.
1990 Cal. App. LEXIS at *32.
198. Kwall, supra note 5. at 42.
199. Id. at 45.
1993]
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bring a combination of claims under these three areas of law. However, the
different purposes behind each body of law makes it difficult to apply the same
standard in interpreting a phrase which is vital to the parties' rights. Copyright
law protects the copyright owner from unlawful appropriation of his expression,
contract law the parties to a contract, and §43(a) protects the author from false or
misleading attributions which are likely to confuse. The court in King implicitly
recognized this by adopting a novel standard for "based upon" in the §43(a)
context. The next section briefly examines how this standard will affect moral
rights protection through §43(a).
B. Moral Rights Protection through §43(a) after King
King takes a step in defining the scope of moral rights protection under §43(a)
of the Lanham Act by offering a standard for determining whether a "based
upon" credit is misleading under §43(a).' Earlier case law and commentators
established that an accurate "based upon" credit can defeat a claim of false or
misleading attribution when an author's name is used in connection with a
modified version of his work.2"' The court in King articulated a standard which
appears much less stringent than a copyright or contract standard given §43(a)'s
concern with consumer confusion because it allows a film company to disclose
to the public that a certain author contributed to the film. Obviously, this
standard did not protect King's right of paternity and integrity because he could
not prevent the use of his name on his work in a modified form.
However, the loose standard could protect the moral rights of artists in
different situations. For example, many authors may want to protect their
paternity interest by preventing the removal of a "based upon" on a film to
which the author contributed. This situation would probably arise more often
where the author is unknown and his name does not carry the selling power of
Stephen King's. If enough of the author's work is incorporated into the film,
§43(a) may not be asserted against the use of his name in the credit even if
unrelated themes, ideas and scenes are added in making the film.
Another example where King may expand protection of the right of paternity
is where an author's name is left off a work to which he contributed. Arguably,
under King, this would be misleading and likely to confuse the public in
violation of §43(a) if enough of the author's work appears in the film. This
theory could circumvent the traditional view that an author cannot receive relief
for lack of attribution absent a contractual provision" and the limitation on the
reverse passing off doctrine that the work must be identical. 3 For example, if
a film draws in material respects from a story and no attribution is given the
author of the story, the author could argue that distributing the film without his
name violates §43(a) because it implies that the director who may get a posses-
200. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 10.
203. See supra notes 11, 41-57 and accompanying text. 32
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sory credit is the sole creator of the work.' In order to cure this misrepre-
sentation the author could vindicate his paternity right by seeking a "based upon"
credit.
As for the right of integrity, King confirms what was recognized by Justice
Gurfein in Gilliam that §43(a) does not protect authors against alteration of their
work absent a false or misleading attribution to that author.' To the extent
that the standard adopted in King clarifies when a "based upon" attribution may
be used, it clarifies the author's right to have his name used on his work in the
form in which he created it.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the development of §43(a) of the Lanham Act as a
vehicle for moral rights protection in the United States and has found that it is
limited where the attribution to the author accurately reflects the author's
contribution to the work. The King case took a step in this development by
articulating a standard by which to ascertain the accuracy of the commonly used
"based upon" credit in films. This standard allows a "based upon" credit when
the film draws in material respects from a literary work, qualitatively and
quantitatively, absent countervailing facts and circumstances. Although the court
did not offer much guidance on how to apply this standard in future cases, it
does appear to be less stringent than the standards for "based upon" in the copy-
right and contract context. While this standard prevented King from recognizing
his paternity and integrity rights, there may be situations where this standard
could assist an author who wants to have his contribution to a work recognized
in a "based upon" credit.
204. See supra note 11.
205. See supra notes 110-117.
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